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ABSTRACT
Title of research paper:

Ransom Negotiation with Somali Pirates based on
Bargaining Model

Degree:

Master of Science in International Transport and Logistics

Somali piracy has been a very serious issue and huge ransom bills paid to Somali
pirates are arousing related parties’ concern. Although there are many qualitative
studies on pirate ransom from the perspective of maritime law, it lacks empirical
quantitative study on the application of bargaining model on piracy problem. The
ransoms demanded by pirates and paid by shipowners are influenced by various
factors. This paper investigates the characteristics of Somali pirates and identifies
the empirical determinants of ransom bargaining result. Then this paper builds the
dynamic tri-stages alternating-offers bargaining model with one-sided asymmetric
information to determine ransom settings. Based on this model, further analysis of
factors that affect the bargaining equilibrium outcome is done and corresponding
suggestions in shipowner’s favor to lower his losses are put forward.

KEYWORDS:

Piracy, ransom, bargaining model, Somalia.
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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Background

In recent years, the number of global piracy 1 incidents is rising, the behavior of pirates is
becoming more abominable and the range of activities is expanding. All these seriously
affect the global shipping industry and international trade and production activities. It greatly
threatens the safety of life at sea and ships’ property, especially in the Gulf of Aden and the
waters of the Horn of Africa.

Although the affects of Somalis pirates on the international shipping and what
countermeasures should be taken has focused international attention on ransom payments,
little empirical work has been done investigating the determinants of ransoms. Since
Somali pirates tend to demand sizeable ransoms for the release of captured crews and
cargoes, it forces global shipowners, cargo-owners and insurance companies to re-adjust
their maritime business strategies.

1

"Piracy" is defined in article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as
follows:
"Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private
ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on
board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State;
(b)
any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or
(b)."
1

1.2 The Research Problem

Reported ransoms paid to Somali pirates have been rising steadily in the last few years.
However, when it comes to ransom payments and negotiation lengths, it differs a lot from
shipowner to shipowner. Why can some shipowners pay relatively low ransoms after a few
weeks, while others must negotiate in excess of a year to ransom their ships for
overwhelming high bills? How do shipowners and Somali pirates bargain when they have
asymmetric information available?

In order to answer these questions, this paper mainly explores the following problems:

(1) The characteristics of modem-day piracy and related ransom issues;
(2) Study on piracy and ransom from legal and insurance perspective;
(3) The theoretical determinants of ransom settings according to the characteristics of
Somali piracy and ransoms;
(4) The ransom negotiation decision making strategy based on Game Theory, i.e. the
dynamic alternating-offers bargaining model with one-sided asymmetric information;
(5) Factors that affect the ransom negotiation result and corresponding countermeasures.

1.3 The Expected Contribution

It is of significant importance to improve the shipping enterprises’ capability of risk analysis
and risk control in the ransom bargaining process. This not only provides shipping
companies with some theoretical guidance for the numerical calculation of ransom offer
and counteroffer when it comes to decision making strategy on ransom negotiation, but
also gives some practical suggestion what appropriate measures should be taken for
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shipowners’ ransom payment in dealing with emergency situations. In detail, there are
mainly the following contributions:

(1) Theoretical significance：In the existing literature, most scholars did qualitative studies
on pirate ransom from the perspective of the legal nature and insurance liability of
ransom payment. Yet little economic analysis has been done from shipowners,
shippers and insurance companies’ point of view. On the other hand, although game
theory is widely used, it lacks empirical quantitative study on the application of
bargaining model on piracy problem. It is of great theoretical significance to apply
bargaining model on pirate ransom.
(2) Practical significance：For the shipowner, the cargo spoils and the ship goes unused.
He also suffers hire loss. For the pirates, the captured crew must be fed and the ship
guarded. Both sides hope to maximize their own interests (or minimize their losses) in
the given conditions. Furthermore, these numerical representations of the bargaining
model can be used by shipowner to strategically identify and improve ransom
negotiation skills so as to put pressure on Somali pirates’ kidnapping and reduce
payment amount.

This paper aims to provide some reference to promote the application of bargaining model
for shipping enterprises when they are hijacked ships for ransom.

1.4 Research Methodology and Framework

This paper uses the following two methodologies, namely desk research and bargaining
model.

The writer starts out with the existing research on pirate ransom from maritime law
perspective and then moves to game theory. Then the ransom negotiation problem based
3

on bargaining model is studied. With the typical tri-stages bargaining model as basic theory,
the writer considers the asymmetric information factors, such as different ransom price
intervals and various psychological pressure, which shipowners and pirates are faced with
in the ransom bargaining process. Next this paper investigates the ransom bargaining
model with asymmetric pressure under incomplete information. Finally the model
assessment is made considering various factors which affect the ransom bargaining
process and result, and suggestions are put forward in shipowners’ favor from both
shipowners’ perspective and pirates’ perspective.

This paper is mainly divided into five chapters and the basic framework is as follows:
Chapter 1 is an introduction mainly on the research background and research problem, as
well as the expected contribution and research methodology. It serves as a backdrop to the
further research on ransom negotiation of this paper. Chapter 2 focuses on the theoretical
research on pirate ransom and game theory. It reviews the existing study on ransom from
legal and insurance perspective, as well as the current study of bargaining theory and
game theory’s application in maritime field. Chapter 3 first identifies the geographical
characteristics of Somali pirate ransoms, and then analyzes the factors affecting the
bargaining process. The writer points out the existing problems that remain to be solved.
Chapter 4 uses mathematical modeling to solve the problem of ransom negotiations.
Starting out with classical bargaining model and identifying ransom bargaining specification,
this paper builds ransom negotiation model and does some basic analysis of both
shipowners’ and pirates’ negotiating behavior. Chapter 5 is the model assessment. The
writer explores correlationship between final ransom result and various factors. Then this
paper develops corresponding decision-making strategies in shipowners’ favor in order to
perform appropriate negotiation skills during the ransom negotiating process. In closing, the
writer makes a brief summary on this research paper and points out the deficiencies and
future research directions.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review

2.1 The Problem of Piracy and Ransom

2.1.1 Research on Piracy Issues

The activity of modern-day pirates does not change greatly compared with historical pirate
activity range. It mainly still gathers on the route from Africa to Asia, and near South
America and Caribbean.

Where do pirates attack? What do pirates attack? Figure 2 shows statistics on Somali
pirate attacks in 2006-2010. Table 1 and Figure 3 show the distribution of global attacks on
different ship types in 2010.

Figure 2 Somali pirate attacks, in 2006-2010
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Compared with historical pirate activity range, modern pirate activity range does not change
greatly. It mainly still gathers on the route from Africa to Asia, and near South America and
Caribbean.

In general, the main activity areas of modern-day pirates range from West African coast,
Somali Peninsula, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the coast of Bay of Bengal and the entire
Southeast Asian waters. Among them, the Southeast Asian waters are the most dangerous
areas under pirate attack in the world. With a total of 1567 pirate attacks between 1991 and
2001, it accounted for about 66% of the global maritime piracy. [1] Most of the vicious pirate
cases in the world in the past happened here. Figure 1 reveals that pirate attacks near
Somalia are getting worse in recent years.

Table 1 Number of global attacks on different ship types in 2010
Ship Type

No. of
attacks

No. of
attacks

Ship Type

Ship Type

Unit: ship
No. of
attacks

Bulk carrier

80

Passenger ship

1

LNG

1

Cement carrier

2

Reefer ship

4

LPG

7

Container ship

74

Research vessel

1

Fishing boats

19

Floating crane

1

Ro - ro ship

6

Tug

20

Dhows

4

Wood chip carrier

1

Patrol boat

1

Dredger

1

Naval auxiliary

1

Car Carrier

5

General cargo ship

63

Bitumen carrier

2

Livestock carrier

1

1

Landing craft

2

Yacht

1

Pipe laying vessel

1

Product tanker

96

Total

445

Unspecified type

2

Crude oil tanker

43

Heavy-cargo
Carrier
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Figure 3 Vessels attacked, by type, in 2010

Unit: percent
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The above statistics suggest that highjack targets of modern pirates mainly focus on
product tanker, bulk carrier, container ship, general cargo ship and crude oil tanker. Once
the ship is hijacked, shipowner, shipper and insurance company will suffer significant
losses. One of the reasons is that modern ships are more vulnerable under pirate attacks
due to automation.[2] These types of ships feature high ship price and cargo value.

Ships and cargoes suffer the mounting pirate threat. According to the International Maritime
Bureau (IMB), it was estimated that before 1996 the world suffered an annual loss of about
$ 0.3-0.45 billion due to pirate attacks. By 2002, this figure substantially increased to about
$ 16-25 billion.[3] Besides, the Pirate Information Center (IMB) located in Malaysia found
that the probability of hostage being rescued after the ship was hijacked offshore is less
than 10%, while the probability of successful rescuing hostages onshore is more than
8

90%.[4]

Since piracy problem will still exist in a certain period of time, shipowners will continue to
suffer from paying pirate ransoms. Hoping a smooth voyage and goods’ arrival on time,
shipowners have to pay the ransom in order to minimize their loss and delay. Therefore, it
is necessary to study issues related to pirate ransom.

2.1.2 Study on Ransom from Legal and Insurance Perspective

The attacks on commercial shipping vessels by Somali pirates have introduced a business
dilemma for ship-owners. Pay it or not? When to pay it? How much should be paid?

The existing literature on pirate ransom mainly focuses on the legal nature of pirate ransom
and marine insurance liability.

First of all, English law admits the legitimacy of the ransom. The London insurance market’s
interest in classifying pirate ransom into general average reveals that under total loss or
constructive total loss of the ship and the cargo, the insurance company will have to suffer
more indemnity loss. Therefore, the insurance company has no choice but to make this
decision from their own interests.[5] Shi Dan suggested that ransom be distinguished
according to liability regime and it should be shared between shipowner and cargo-owner
according to salved value ratio. [6]

The losses of ransom payment among involved parties vary a lot under different chartering
types. We should discuss ransom payment respectively under three circumstances, namely
voyage charter, time charter and liner shipping contract. Shipowner, as the owner of
big-ticket ship, is not always the top gainer from the ransom payment. [7]

Is it necessary to pay ransom? The author proper thinks that, at present, it still seems
9

acceptable to pay a ransom. Because the ransom payment is in the purpose of avoiding
property damage rather than direct property damage itself. Pirates as a threat, mainly
embodied in the following aspects: 1) It is a direct threat to people's life and safety; 2) It
causes direct economic loss, such as pirate robbery, theft of goods and delay of the voyage.
So, we should not rigidly identify paying ransom to Somali pirates as illegal and neglect the
necessity of paying ransom.

However, problem and weakness still exist.

When it comes to studies on Somali piracy, scholars mainly study the problem of anti-piracy
on legal basis and discuss its insufficient political aspects. Besides, the existing literature
on ransom payment mainly focused on 1) the legal nature of pirate ransom and 2) marine
insurance liability from maritime law perspective. What’s more, the research methods used
in the current studies concerning piracy and ransom are 1) qualitative analysis method and
2) case study method.

From the economic perspective, however, there are little empirical articles on pirate ransom,
especially on ransom negotiation. Despite its legal importance, little studies have been
done investigating the determinants of ransom negotiations or numerically identify ransom
amount.

2.2 Research on Bargaining Theory

2.2.1 Study and Application of Bargaining Theory

The major objects of existing literature on bargaining model are model construction, range,
ability (bargaining power), solution, and cost coefficient.
10

Model construction is widely used in decision making in merger and acquisition
negotiations, and in establishing cooperative alliance in supply chain. Bargaining range
aims at determining the effective bargaining rang when considering incentive
mechanism, risk assessment and so on into account. Bargaining solution discusses
corresponding equilibrium point under complete information static game; complete
information dynamic game; incomplete information static game and incomplete information
dynamic game respectively.[8] Research on bargaining cost coefficients suggests that
when the range of bargaining cost coefficients of both sides is decided, rational
manufacturers and sellers will choose to cooperate and share the interests in accordance
with the bargaining solution and realize "win-win" situation. [9]

When it comes to applications, most bargaining models are applied on regulated markets,
ranging from logistics company, power market, high-tech enterprise, investment bank,
farming industry to transnational company’s horizontal or vertical integration. For example,
logistics companies apply bargaining theory to decide the optimal cost input and price
setting strategy in promotion problems. Two papers constructed the bargaining game
model with incomplete and power consumer, then an integrated market organized by
regulated electric utilities is modeled. [10,11]

2.2.2 Application of Game Theory in Maritime Field

In maritime field, major applications of game theory are based on cooperation- competition
theory.

In horizontal perspective, it aims to avoid vicious competition among ports whose
geographical locations are very close. Meanwhile, it encourages ports to complement each
other's advantages and share their resource. Thus, game theory is applied in order to give
guidance to port enterprises on how to cooperate with other ports for better development.
11

Based on the cooperation strategy model, one paper points out the construction of
Shanghai international shipping center is a turning point for the ports in Yangtze Delta,
transforming from non-cooperative game into cooperative game. [12] Based on the Hotelling
model, the port’s optimal choice for the service strategy and pricing strategy is modeled. [13]

In vertical perspective, the implementation of game theory aims at enhance cooperation of
supply chain’s strategic alliance, and scholars try to optimize the logistic and management
procedure to shorten receiving, shipping and transit lead time and decrease total logistic
cost. Suggestions are made for better coordination between firms like shipping company,
port or third-party logistics company who offer services along the service stream in supply
chain system. One paper on port logistics enterprise alliance based on Bertrand oligopoly
model shows that the differentiation of development strategy is a good choice for port.
Under the guidance of port logistics enterprise's strategic alliance, port can meet the
challenge; realize healthy competition and sustainable development in an effective way. [14]

From the above, we can see that game theory is widely used in maritime field. And the
focus of the above study is based on cooperation-competition game theory. Through a lot of
case study by emphasizing on interactive and systematic of game theory, plus considering
the characteristics of different ports and shipping companies，analyses are made on the
metrics of maritime enterprises countermeasures. Afterwards, suggestions of strategic
management are put forward in order to build shipping industry into a healthier
environment.

As pirate issue is attracting more attention, research on this topic is worthwhile. While most
current literature focuses on cooperation-competition game theory, it belongs to the
category of external cooperation for all parties’ better development. When it comes to
ransom negotiation, however, our target is simply to minimize shipowner side’s loss rather
than for both parties’ (shipowner’s and pirate’s) interest. Besides, little quantitative study
has been done on pirate ransom.

12

Taking all above into account, we can find that research on ransom negotiation from
economic perspective is supplementary to the existing literature and meaningful. Similar to
commercial activities, the Somali pirates also obey the laws of economics. They found that
hijacking ships for ransom is much more profitable than just looting property. On the other
hand, other players involved in the pirate event, such as shipping companies, cargo-owners,
insurance companies, private security companies, navies etc., must also face the interests’
trade-off. Therefore, ransom negotiation between shipowner and Somali pirate fits the
bargaining model well.

13

Chapter Three: Analysis of Somali Pirate Ransoms

3.1 Characteristics of Somali Piracy and Ransoms

Being a long-standing issue impacting the world, the rampancy of Somali piracy can be
attributed to complicated causes regarding both domestic factors and international factors.

There are many factors causing this issue, such as the prolonged internal political instability
in Somalia, the economic recession that brought the financial system to the brink of
collapse and the extreme destitution of the state for a long time. In addition, the United
States and Europe are reluctant to get involved in the internal affairs of Somalia, while
African countries cannot afford to help restore domestic stability and economic
development in Somalia. It also lacks special international conventions emphasizing on
anti-pirate operation, resulting in a very embarrassing situation for international cooperation
fighting against piracy.

Furthermore, Somali piracy shows significant geographical characteristics. The peculiar
geographical location provides a breeding ground for the rampancy of Somali piracy.
Somalia is located in the junction of the Red Sea, Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The
complexity of sea condition and terrain, the narrow channel (especially along the Red Sea)
and sufficient water branches surrounding the coast are in favor of Somali pirates’ quick
getaway and hide.

The above factors, to a great extent, encourage the poor people of Somalia to make money
by hijacking international ships and taking the crew and the cargo as hostage.

Currently, Somali piracy shows some new characteristics mainly as follows. 1) The timing of
14

attacks is changing from daytime to all day long. 2) The activity area is extending gradually
from 30 nautical miles to more than 1,000 nautical miles. 3) The pirate equipment is
upgrading more sophisticated, such as AK-47 rifles, RPG-7shoulder-fired rocket-propelled
grenades, grenade launchers, grenades, anti-tank rockets, high-powered fishing boats,
hook speedboats, satellite phones and other advanced equipment. 4) The attacking tactic
is becoming tricky. For instance, pirate boats tend to hide and blend in with the fishing traffic,
catching passing ships off their guard. 5) The pirate organizations are making alliance.

Faced with such pirates and if the ship carries valuable or dangerous goods onboard,
modern navy judges that the potential risks posed by fighting piracy may outweighs that of
not taking action. The captain will, of course, do everything he could to scare away the
attacking pirates. However, if the ship carries chemicals and petroleum, shipowner will
remind the captain not to act rashly in case pirates deployed "heavy weapons” for unable to
board. Let alone the casualties and the financial losses of the shipping companies.

Despite the risk of being hijacked, the costs substantially increase to take a detour. To
illustrate, it takes 12 hours and hundreds of thousands of dollars to voyage between Europe
and Asia by Suez Canal and Somali Coast. While facing bad weather conditions, the
deviation around the Cape of Good Hope costs an extra sailing distance of 16,000
kilometers and increases the cost up to millions of dollars. Therefore, the number of ships
voyaging through the canal still increases from 15,000 in 2003 to more than 20,000 in 2008.
So, after trade-off analysis between detouring cost and hijack risk (1/600 ships being
hijacked), shipping companies prefer adventure. Of course, the premium of the high-risk
routes is accordingly expensive. The K&R insurance surcharged by Lloyds of London's for
single voyage is 0.25% of the ship’s price. For example, it costs the VLCC Sirius Star
$ 380,000 to pay this K&R insurance as the ship’s value is $150 million.

Judging from the above, we can suggest that factors affecting the ransom amount cover
pirate ransom related costs, ranging from ship and cargo’s price, ship hire loss, ransom
loss, crew responsibility, legal fees and the cost of emergency response occurring in the
15

course of kidnapping. Risk assessment and considerations of potential risk evaluation
should be taken into consideration as well.

3.2 Factors that Affect the Ransom Amount

How do characteristics of Somali piracy and shipowners’ behavior affect the ransom deal?

3.2.1 Humanitarian Reasoning
Pirates kidnap and ransom hostages in different waters worldwide. Compared with most
other regions of the world, Somali piracy is unique because its main purpose of kidnapping
crew and passengers is to trade the hostages for ransom payments. In other words,
Somalia hijack is in the purpose of obtaining ransom income. While the aim of attacking
ships sailing in other regions, for instance off the West coast of Africa, is conducted most
likely due to political terror and criminal opportunism reasons under a different hijacking
purpose.

To illustrate different hijacking purpose in detail, the writer finds that Nigerian pirates act
differently from Somali pirates. The former pirates are willing to use violence to attack ships
in the delta region so as to steal fuel through pipelines and then sell it illegally in the black
market. On the other hand, the motivation of hijacking of Somali pirates is for a better
standard of living for themselves.

If we simply reject to pay the ransom, it may induce Somali pirates to seek an alternate
means of income generation which is less conducive to safety and peaceful resolution. So,
the possible impacts of these alternatives may be making the pirates more reluctant to take
care of the onboard hostages.

16

3.2.2 Economic Reasoning

At present, ransoms may be a reasonable choice for the shipping industry to do business.
Shipowners pointed out that compared with simply paying ransoms, the cost of increased
insurance premiums and other costs such as time and resources consumed in order to fight
back Somali piracy may actually exceed the ransom payment amount. Maintaining armed
security is likely to cost the shipowner more than a million dollars per vessel annually in the
Somali region, while yet this security cannot completely guarantee to hold back all pirate
attacks.

Losses caused by delays are another important aspect of economic concerns. Cargo may
suffer a financial loss associated with carriage contract. Onboard crew should be paid their
wages even when the ship is detained because of hijacking. [15]

Besides, the related insurance expenses, for instance the Kidnap and Ransom (K&R)
Insurance provided by Standard Club and other financial costs of Protection &
Indemnity (P&I) Club, will increase due to the higher risk of rapid recovery of the crew and
ships. [16]

3.3 Existing Problems that Remains to Be Solved

Since the real-world ransom negotiations are extremely complex, this paper develops a
simplified bargaining model (a finite game of alternating offers). It remains to be solved how
to establish a reasonable mathematical model based on bargaining theory to quantitatively
describe pirate ransom problem. As both sides hope to maximize their own interests (or
minimize their losses) in the given conditions, it is a challenging task to establish
appropriate indicator system and to choose the most suitable bargaining model for taking
large amounts of information into account. Furthermore, it also remains to be solved how to
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apply these mathematical representations of the bargaining model by shipowner to make
strategic decision and improve ransom negotiation skills in practice so as to put pressure
on Somali pirates’ kidnapping and reduce shipowners’ hijacking losses. This paper builds a
dynamic bargaining model with several stages of alternating offers to further study this
ransom problem.

Due to asymmetric information and cognitive differences between negotiating parties, each
side has asymmetric incentives in the bargaining process. Therefore, we should pay
attention to the negotiator's behavior and their influence on the opposite player’s interaction.
The following factors are likely to have impact on the final negotiations equilibrium result,
namely the predetermined price range, turns of offering and counter-offering, diversity of
different roles.

In addition, we should simplify some basic concepts such as players, strategies, payoffs,
orders and equilibrium. For example: Who is the first mover and has the first-mover
advantage? What is the acceptable bargaining price interval for each side? How many
turns of offering and counter-offering should be considered? How to evaluate the time value
of ship and cargo? How does negotiator’s mental status affect their attitude towards
discount factor in the bargaining model? All these are lack of existing reference and require
further discussion in details.
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Chapter Four: Bargaining Model Construction

The ransom negotiation length and the final ransom amount are the bargaining outcome
between a pirate gang and a shipowner. In this section the writer develops an
alternating-offers bargaining model in order to analyze ransom negotiation process. The
writer enhances this model considering the implications of allowing for incomplete
information.

4.1. The Alternating-Offers Bargaining Model

4.1.1 The assumptions and basic model

(1) Assume that there are two participants, pirate (seller) and shipowner (buyer), bargain
for the final ransom amount.

(2) The acceptable ransom range (the predetermined transaction ransom range) of pirate
and shipowner respectively is [a1, a2], [b1, b2] (a1 is the minimum reserve ransom of
pirate, b2 is the maximum reserve ransom of shipowner, a1,2 > 0, b1,2 > 0. Considering
the true condition, let b1<a1, b2 <a2, b2>a1), therefore the negotiating interval is [a1, b2]
(see Figure 4). Here the writer considers the two participants reach an agreement
before the deadline rather than the negotiation breaks down.

(3) Set rf as the ransom price of the successful negotiation, thus r f ∈ [a1, b2]. rf−a1 is pirates’
surplus, b2−pf is shipowner’s surplus. For pirates (the seller), rf is the bigger the better.
While for shipowner (the buyer), rf is the smaller the better.
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(4) The ransom negotiation activity is a dynamic process which is simplified into tri-stages.
(I.e. the pirates make the initial offer in period t=1, the shipowner makes a counter-offer
in period t=2, and the pirates make the final offer in period t=3.)

(5) The transaction goods have time value, thus we introduce the time parameter — the
discount rate σ (0≤σ≤1). It can be assigned practical implications, like the bank interest
rate, traders’ required rate of return and so on. Even the transaction is completed very
quickly, the discount rate still counts: The value of perishable fruits and agricultural
products will drastically reduces if they are held up. The business opportunity will lose if
business intelligence of strategic significance is delayed. The patient is at stake if he is
not rescued timely (future value of life is discounted to being infinitesimal). And of
course, due to the depreciation of goods and negotiation expenditure, both sides have a
loss of payoff. It can be represented by σ. This explains why in practice players make
transaction decision in a relatively short period of time -- because they concern about
the depreciation of cargo’s value.

The psychological state of the negotiator will affect his view of discounted income.
Through the ages, numerous cases have proved they are likely to rapidly compromise
and accept fewer benefits when the players find themselves in trouble. It is because
they cannot effectively and promptly deal with such dilemmas as non-negotiable
clauses, qualified ultimatum and unchangeable deadline. Psychology studies shows
that time pressure makes communication accuracy reduced in the negotiation and
quickly leads players to reach an agreement. This is mainly because the high-stress
environment reduces negotiators’ systematic information processing motivation and
makes them rely more on heuristic clues. Moreover, time pressure will reduce the
cognitive motivation of negotiators and lead to their systematic cognitive bias. It induces
the negotiator to ignore some important information and misjudgment. All these imply
that the negotiation environment and bargaining process can, to some extent, put
psychological pressure on negotiators. If negotiators anti-stress capability is poor, it is
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very likely that the negotiators will appear urgency, frustration, disappointment, fear and
other negative emotions. Their cognitive competence and information processing
capability will be badly affected. It may lead to negotiators’ misevaluation on the
generated benefit, resulting in faster compromise or yield loss.

In general, considering the true condition, it is necessary to ensure: 1) when 0 ≤ r <∞, there
exists dσ/dr < 0; 2) when R → ∞, there exists σ → 0; and 3) 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1. To simplify our
discussion, we select the simplest one among many expressions which meet these
requirements: σ=1/(1+r) (0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ r < ∞). Apparently σ is inversely proportional to r. In
reality, the bargaining process can be regarded as dividing residual value among players
concerning goods, technology, capital and information. Thus the bargaining interval can be
represented as [a1, b2] if there are only two players involved in the game, and the final price
is defined as pf after several rounds of bargaining. Further, in the condition of complete
information, namely, [a1, a2] and [b1, b2] are known to both players, the above negotiation
activities can be converted to the classic dividing cake game. The two players strategically
negotiate the split ratio “rf” in the interval [0, 1]. (rf is the mapping of pf on [0,1]: rf =
(pf−a1)/(b2−a1)), as shown in Figure 4.

4.1.2 The tri-stages bargaining model

There is tri-stages bargaining model applied to the dividing cake game, as follows: Set
player A’s initial offer is xt, thus player B’s income is 1−xt. (Player B’s proposing
counter-offer of player A is yt, thus player B's income is 1−yt.) The income at each stage
should be discounted to the initial bargaining stage. t = 1, 2, 3. Therefore, we have:

(1) t = 1: Player A quotes the first offer price x1, leaving 1−x1 with player B. If player B
accepts, the two players respectively benefits x1 and 1 −x1. The negotiation terminates.
If not, it goes to the next stage — t = 2: Player B counter-offers the price y2 for player A,
leaving 1−y2 with himself. If player A accepts, the two players respectively benefits σy2
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and σ(1−y2). The negotiation terminates. If not, it goes to the next stage — t = 3: Player
A counter-offers the price x3, leaving1−x3 with player B. As this is the final stage of the
bargaining process, Player B has no choice but to accept. The two players respectively
benefits σ2y2 and σ2(1−y2), as shown in Figure 5.

(2)

According to the reverse deduction, there exists the only sub-game perfect Nash

equilibrium point: x1=1/(1+σ). By that analogy, the according results can be deduced for
other limited stage (t <∞) bargaining game.

4.2 Ransom Bargaining Specification

Objective features, such as negotiation duration, ship type, ship age and flag-state of
the ship, as well as the manning of its crew, are expected to play roles in determining
the final ransom amount. [17]

(1) Time period：This variable measures the stage of ransom bargaining stage. It
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signals the difference between the date of attack and the date of release, here
this paper simplify it into three stages, represented by t = 1, 2, 3.

(2) Ransom amount：Ransom amount is the size of money demanded or paid by
corresponding parties. Here this paper mainly considers three types of ransom
amount. Namely, lower bound ransom, upper bound ransom and ransom exactly
paid. However, as pirate ransom is a sensitive issue, the ransom amount is not
always publicly disclosed, making reliable estimates difficult to obtain. So, this
paper refers to some basic concepts mentioned in maritime law field to set up the
ransom negotiation intervals. To illustrate, the pirates can obtain the utility α from
using the ship as a mother-ship putting the worth of the minimum ransom amount
(lower bound) required by pirates at a1. If the shipowner offers any ransom less
than α, the offer is rejected and the negotiation ends. Similarly, the shipowner
can get the compensation amount β from an insurance claim for constructive total
loss (CTL), which is worth b1 as the lower bound of shipowner’s bargaining
interval.

(3) Ship value：The hijacked ship, along with its cargo and onboard crew, is
considered to worth a particular amount of money. This paper considers the
following variables as proxies to evaluate the ship value, represented by v.

(3.1) Ship Age：The age of a ship is considered to have impact on the value of the
ship. The writer calculates the ship age by taking the time difference between the
year of construction and the year of capture.

(3.2) Flag State：The flag state of a vessel is likely to reveal whether the
shipowner is rich or poor. A vessel flying a flag from developed country implies
that its owner is rich. On the other hand, a ship flying the well-known “flag of
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convenience” indicates its shipowner is probably either located in a poor country
or obscures his ownership.

(3.3) Crew size：The number of people on board the ship after it has been
captured is another factor. It is strongly dependent on ship type, i.e. the more
modern and automated the ship is, the fewer crew members onboard the ship.
Here this paper excludes those who fled during the hijacking. Generally speaking,
the more hostages seized by the pirate gang, the stronger the pirates’ bargaining
power.

(3.4) Crew value：Crew of the nationalities from developed countries will be
evaluated more valuable than those of nationalities from underdeveloped
countries.

(4) Pirate hijack costs ： Assume the pirate’s hijack cost equals c0. The pirate’s
transaction costs may play a role. For instance, their expenses on daily necessity
are increasing with each passing day. To simplify the model, this paper set the
daily pirate hijack cost as fixed amount. However, in real-world the daily cost
keeps changing over time.

4.3 Model Building

This section builds a tri-stage bargaining model to study and analyze the ransom
negotiation process. Considering asymmetric pressure and incomplete information,
such as psychological stress hypothesis, time-sensitive discount factor and different
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negotiating interval, the writer constructs a simplified ransom bargaining model that
seeks to extract major influence factors from the complex real-world ransom
negotiation.

4.3.1 Bargaining under Asymmetric Pressure and Incomplete Information

In reality, we should take into account the risk of negotiation breakdown. Meanwhile,
the negotiating interval [a1, b2] is not very clear to both parties (that is why the
shipowner always wants to know the pirate’s lower bound and pirate wants to know
the shipowner’s upper bound). To simplify the analysis, we have the following
assumptions:

(1) The two parties have different discount rates σp ≠ σs. In addition, we exclude
extreme condition: neither the negotiating parties have no patience (σ p,s = 0) nor
do they have infinite patience (σp,s = 1).

(2) Both parties have consensus on a1, b1, i.e. a1, b1 are the common knowledge for
both parties. Here, let a1= b1. However, pirate does not know shipowner's upper
bound of ransom price y. He thinks shipowner’s highest reserve price is ym (v0 —
initial value of the ship and cargo). Shipowner knows his own reserve price is Rs2
(v — value of the ship, cargo and crew, etc.).

(3) For the sake of argument, let ym =

− a1, y = b2 – a1, then the original

negotiation interval [a1, b2] is mapped to [0, ym] for pirate and [0, y] for shipowner,
as shown in Figure 6, and Figure 7.

(4) Shipowner is split into two types. A “rich” shipowner can psychologically afford
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the ransom ym raised by pirates, where y ≥ ym. While “poor” shipowner cannot
actually afford the ransom ym, where y < ym.

(5) At the beginning of the entire bargaining process, the pirate only knows that the
shipowner’s counteroffer is uniformly distributed on [0, ym]. However, pirate is not
sure the relationship between y and ym.

(6) Shipowner knows that pirate regards his counteroffer as following uniform
distribution. And he is clear about the relationship between y and ym.

Last but not least, the players meet the basic assumption of the game theory: both
players are seeking the target of increasing the interests and reducing the welfare
loss. This paper only considers three stages of the process. Using the reverse
deduction method, the analysis of the dynamic equilibrium during the bargaining
process is as follows, respectively concerning two types of shipowners:

4.3.2 Tri-stages Ransom Bargaining Structure

4.3.2.1 Bargaining structure for rich shipowner，where y ≥ ym

t = 3: At this period, the pirate makes the final offer. The negotiation ends in this
stage no matter the offer is accepted or rejected. The shipowner, as a rational person
under pressure, will accept any offer the pirate puts forward as long as it belongs to
the ransom bargaining interval (0，ym]. As shown in Figure 6 Bargaining structure for
rich shipowner，where y ≥ ym. Although the shipowner’s upper bound of ransom “y” is
not clear to the pirate, the pirate can quote any price belongs to (0，ym] because he
knows this reaction of the shipowner. So, how does pirate make the optimal decision?
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As mentioned earlier, the pirate estimates the shipowner's offer be uniformly
distributed on (0, ym].

So the expected return of pirate is: max (x3pp +0 (1−Pp)), where x3 — pirate’s offer in
the third stage (0 < x3 ≤ ym); Pp — the probability of pirate’s offer being accepted by
shipowner: Pp = ( ym − x3) / ym；

Then the optimal choice of pirate at this time is:
x3* = argmax [x3pp +0 (1−Pp)]

(4)

The solution is: x3*= ym / 2. So in accordance with pirate’s offer, the shipowner (buyer)
gets the following surplus: y − (ym / 2). In this period, pirate still does not know y.

t = 2: Because there is asymmetric pressure, the payoff of pirate and shipowner in
period t=2 discounted from the last offer (t=3) respectively is: σp ym /2, and σs [y − (ym
/2)]. It is easy to get that when y ≥ ym, shipowner’s surplus is more than his payoff
discounted from period t=2:

y − (σp ym /2) > σs [y − (ym /2)]

(5)

At this stage the shipowner makes counter-offer and his initial decision-making
behavior y2* should satisfy the following condition:

The best-worst quotation: where y2* ≥ σp ym /2,

y − y2* ≥ σs [y − (ym /2)]
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(6)

The best-worst quotation: where y2* ≤ σp ym /2,

y − y2* ≥ σs [y − (ym /2)]

(7)

Formula (6) means that if the offer is accepted by pirate (y2* ≥ σp ym /2), shipowner will
try to maximize his buyer’s surplus; formula (7) means that if the offer is rejected by
pirate, shipowner will also try to maximize his surplus. From (5), (6) and (7), we may
obtain the following formula:

σp ym/2 = y2* < y – σs [y − (ym/2)]

(8)

Because shipowner knows y > ym, he knows this offer will make him get more surplus.
But if the shipowner makes initial offer σp ym/2 = y2*, the pirate will reject shipowner’s
counter-offer even if he does not know the exact value of y in this period. The reason
is that formula (8) has become common knowledge for both parties, and the pirate
can easily screen out y ≥ ym because the shipowner will reveal he is rich by making
such offer.

In order to reach the equilibrium ransom at this stage, the shipowner will make a
counter-offer in this way: He indicates his reserve price is y*, which satisfies: y* − (σp
ym/2) = σs [y*−(ym/2)], i.e. y* = (σp−σs) ym / [2(1−σs)]. It is a deceptive behavior. This is
a credible deception if the pirate merely knows incomplete information and he is
ensured to gain σp ym/2 at the same time. Therefore, for pirate, the bargaining interval
[0, y*] is complete information, it goes back to equilibrium analysis of Dividing Cake
Game. And in this game, shipowner is always able to take advantage because the
common knowledge y* is less than his upper bound ransom (y* < y).
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t = 1: The payoff of pirate and shipowner in period t=1 discounted from the previous
offer (t=2) respectively is: σp2 ym/2, (σp－σs) σs ym/[2 (1－σs)]. The pirate makes his
first offer maximizing his expected payoff, satisfying the following formula:

y－x1 ≥ (σp－σs) σs ym/[2 (1－σs)]

x1 ≤ y－(σp－σs) σs ym/[2 (1－σs)]

Because pirate thinks the highest value of y is ym (y ≥ ym), the optimal choice for him
is obtained he thinks the upper bound of ransom ym is reached:

x1 * = ym－(σp－σs) σs ym/[2 (1－σs)] = ym {1－(σp σs－σs2)/[2(1－σs)] }

(12)

Therefore, the surplus of shipowner is: y1 = y－x1* = y－ym {1－(σp σs－σs2)/[2(1－
σs)] }.

When pirate is not only aware of y ≥ ym but is also clear about the shipowner’s
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decision preference, he would not believe the shipowner’s counter-offer (i.e. the
above counter-offer quoted by shipowner is not credible). Under this circumstances,
the pirate will increase ym by repeating the process in period t = 3 and t = 2 until y= ym
is reached. When y ≥ ym becomes common knowledge, the equilibrium analysis is
back to the Cake Dividing Game.

4.3.2.2 Bargaining structure for poor shipowner，where y < ym

t = 3: In this period, as mentioned in Section 4.3.1.1, pirate does not know the value
of y. So his strategy for optimal decision-making is to estimate the upper bound of
ransom price which can be psychologically accepted by shipowner, and then offer
half the price ym /2. (Figure 7 shows the negotiating interval, where y < ym.) Thus, the
shipowner’s payoff in this period is: y－(ym /2). Obviously, when y－(ym /2) < 0, the
bargaining terminates; when y－(ym /2) ≥ 0, shipowner will accept the offer and
regard y－(ym /2) as his maximum surplus at this stage t=3.

t = 2: The payoff of pirate and shipowner in period t=2 discounted from the last offer
(t=3) respectively is: σp ym /2 and σs [y − (ym /2)]. The shipowner makes counter-offer
and his initial decision-making behavior y2* should satisfy the following condition (9)
(10):

The best-worst quotation: where y2* ≥ σp ym /2,

y－y2* ≥ σs [y－(ym /2)]

The best-worst quotation: where y2* ≤ σp ym /2,
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(9)

y－y2* ≥ σs [y－(ym /2)]

(10)

Then, we may obtain the following formula:

σp ym /2 = y2* < y－σs [y－(ym /2)]

(11)

Because shipowner knows y > ym, he knows this counter-offer will enable him to
obtain more surplus. But if the shipowner makes initial offer σp ym/2 = y2*, as
mentioned in Section 4.3.1.1, this counter-offer will be rejected by the pirate even if
he does not know the exact value of y at this time. So in order to reach the
equilibrium ransom at this stage, the shipowner will indicate that his reserve ransom
price is y*, which satisfies: y* = (σp−σs) ym / [2(1−σs)]. It can be proofed that y* ≤ ym /2.
As mentioned above, the shipowner’s initial reserve ransom price y satisfies: y ≥ y m
/2. Although the exact value of y is not clear to the pirate, the shipowner will reveal
his reserve ransom price y by making such offer in this bargaining process. That is,
when y < ym , the upper bound of shipowner’s ransom price is half the price estimated
by pirate: y* = ym / 2. So the shipowner's optimal game equilibrium choice is: y*－y2*
= ( ym / 2)－(σp ym / 2) = (1－σp) ym / 2.

t = 1: The payoff of pirate and shipowner in period t=1 discounted from the previous
offer (t=2) respectively is: σp2 ym /2、(1－σp) σs ym /2. The pirate makes the first offer
and his decision-making behavior x1 satisfies:

ym－x1=(1－σp) σs ym /2

(12)

So x1 = ym[1－(σs－σpσs/2)] > ym /2, y1 = ym－ x1 = (1－σp) σs ym/2 is the game equilibrium
choice in this period (t=1). And the bargaining structure for poor shipowner, where y
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< ym, is shown in Table 2:

Table 2 Bargaining Game Equilibrium, where y < ym
t

1

2
m

3
m

Shipowner

(1－σp) σs y /2

(1－σp) y /2 

y－( ym/2)

Pirate

ym[1－σs (1－σp /2)] 

σp ym/2

ym/2 

Note:  represents this party makes such offer in this period.

32

Chapter Five: Model Assessment

5.1 Basic Results of the Theoretical Model

The above analysis shows that the ransom bargaining equilibrium outcome is
related to the asymmetric information, different roles and psychological attributes
of the pirates and shipowner. The implications for the ransom amount from the
above bargaining model are summarized as follows:

1) The different roles of the shipowner (buyer) and the pirate (seller) will lead to
different payoff. It is because we assume that the final ransom price is the lower
the better for the shipowner (buyer). On the contrary, it is the higher the better for
the pirate (seller). In addition, it can be found that in the case of asymmetric
information, the shipowner and the pirate can obtain corresponding advantage in
the bargaining process.(For example, as mentioned in Section 4.3.1.1, the
shipowner can make a credible deception by offering y* rather than y2 *. As
mentioned in Section 4.3.1.2, when y < ym, the pirate has seller’s advantage).

2) In Section 4.3.1.1, if the shipowner is greedy, there will be another situation that
the shipowner still reports σp ym/2 = y2*. After making y ≥ ym become common
knowledge, the pirate will repeat the procedure in period t = 3 and t = 2 in oeder
to increase ym until y = ym. Then it becomes back to the Cake Dividing Game.
This

shows

that

besides

asymmetric

information,

the

psychological

characteristics of negotiators affect the final equilibrium outcome as well.
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3) In the bargaining game, a rich shipowner, whose upper bound of ransom y is
more than the pirate's estimation of the upper bound y m (y ≥ ym), will continuously
be suppressed by the pirate in the negotiation process until his final reserve price
is reached — such type of shipowner definitely overpays for the ransom. Being a
wise shipowner, the basic strategy is "offering half of the price". And this strategy
is based on the assumption that shipowner’s offer is uniformly distributed on the
negotiating interval (see equation (4)). It theoretically proves that the thumb rule
of "offering half of the price" has its innate laws of things in practice. Further, if the
shipowner’s offer is not uniformly distributed, there might be such bargaining
strategy as "offering lower than half of the price" or "offering a quarter of the
price".

5.1.1 Discount Factor Analysis — σp, σs

The two parties have different discount rates σp ≠ σs. Assume the psychological
pressure of pirate and shipowner are rp, rs. If the negotiator is under high pressure,
he tends to regard the future value very low discounted into present value. In other
words, the discount rate under high pressure is less than the discount rate under low
pressure. It means σ is negatively correlated with r. For further analysis, here, we set
σp = 1/(1+rp), σs = 1/(1+ rs).

It is more necessary for a poor shipowner, where y < ym, to find his optimal bargaining
strategy since he cannot afford overwhelming ransom. According to the bargaining
game equilibrium outcome as shown in Table 4-2, the partial derivatives of x1 with
respect to rx, ry are written as:
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,

(13)

The partial derivatives of y1 with respect to rx, ry, similarly, are written as:

,

(14)

Formula (13) and (14) shows that the ransom amount is:
a) Negatively correlated with his own stress factor;
b) Positively correlated with other player’s stress factor;

According to a) and b), we can find that in the case of asymmetric pressure and
incomplete information, the greater pressure the negotiator has and the more eager
he is to conclude the transaction, the less payoff he will obtain in the end of the
negotiation deal.

5.1.2 Lower and Upper Bound Ransom Price Analysis — a1, b1, y, ym

Both the analyses in Section 4.3.1.1 and Section 4.3.1.2 show that the pirate always
seizes the initiative in deciding the ultimate payoff, since ym shows up in the formulas
for calculating the bargaining game equilibriums.

For a poor shipowner, where y < ym, the equilibrium of the optimal ransom payoff is
x1= (1－σp) σs ym/2 and y1 = ym[1－σs (1－σp /2)]. And because 0 < σp < 1, and 0 < σs < 1,
it is easy to proof that the partial derivatives of x1 and y1 with respect to ym are written
as:
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－

(15)

Formula (15) shows that the optimal ransom payoff is positively correlated with the
pirate’s (the seller) estimation of the shipowner’s upper bound ransom price ym. To
further analyze factors that affect pirate’s estimation of ransom price, ym is discussed
in detail below:

What might be the elements of ym and y? Pirate’s estimation of ransom price involves
a wide set of factors. In general, it is closely related to objective estimates of the
value of ship and its cargo, and the value of the lives of the crew. Objective estimates,
such as ship type, ship-size, ship age (refer to the built year) and flag state of the
ship are used by the pirates to evaluate the ship value acceptable by the shipowner.
Also the make-up of its crew affects the estimation of crew value. That is to say,
pirates tend to recognize that crew from rich countries increase the probability that
the shipowner is also located in a rich country, accordingly implying a higher ransom
value. For instance, pirates will estimate British hostages to be more valuable than
Pakistani equivalents. Besides, the pirate’s initial seizure cost c 0 that daily seizure
cost cp that they spend each day for on-board supplies have impact on ym.

Similarly, we can set vs as the actual value of the ship, cargo and crew evaluated by
shipowner. Let τ∊(0, 1) be the shipowner’s depreciation rate of his ship and cargo as
ship depreciates and cargo degrades or perishes, cp be the shipowner’s daily cost as
onboard supplies are consumed and hiring income loses.

Here, set ym = vp + co + t×cp and y = τt-1 vs + t×cs,
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－

,

According to the above formulas, if we only consider patial derivative of upper bound
ransom with respect to time, both ym and y are positively correlated with negotiation
duration. It means the longer the negotiation duration, the higher the ransom amount
of the negotiation deal.

When it comes to the lower bound of ransom price a1, b1, the minimum ransom is
only accepted when it equals to the same utility as the player at least can obtain from
other means. From the pirate’s perspective, if the negotiation ends, he can utilize the
ship as a “mother-ship” in the future, with the value α. Therefore, he must be offered
at least what he can obtain from using the ship as a mother-ship. On the other hand,
the shipowner is able to recover some losses, say β, through an insurance claim for
constructive total loss. The lower bound of ransom prices a1, b1 are therefore:

a1 = α,

b1 = β

However, as mentioned above in bargaining model construction, in order to simplify
the analysis, this paper sets α = β. But in complex real-world, it is scarcely possible
that these two parameters are equal.

5.2 Ransom Negotiation Strategy

Based on the formulas put forward in the ransom bargaining model and further
analysis in Section 5.1, the shipowner has some practical ways of reducing the
welfare loss due to piracy. It is mainly from shipowner’s own perspective and from
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pirates’ perspective.

5.2.1 Suggestions from Shipowner’s Perspective

To increase shipowner’s discount factor σs and depreciation factor τ. As we know, if
the shipowner is under lower pressure, he tends to regard the future value relatively
high discounted into present value. Therefore, it is beneficial to make ship-owners
more “patient” in their negotiations. For example, by governments providing
emergency loan guarantees to cover the running cost of the hijack, or compensating
ship-owners for loss of hire, while offering significant financial compensation to the
crew.

5.2.2 Suggestions from Pirates’ Perspective

To reduce pirate’s discount factor σp and his estimation of the upper bound of
shipowner’s ransom price ym. The current approach – sea-based intervention by
navies and private security companies – appears to have reduced pirates’ success
rates and increased their costs.

The pirate’s discount factor σp can be reduced through increasing his physiological
pressure. First, make it less stable for pirate to keep the hijack ship. Pirates have to
keep the ships safe from rival gangs as well as local law enforcement initiatives,
whether these are local grass-roots or foreign-sponsored regional government
campaigns. Second, cut the supply of pirate’s daily demand, once on-board supplies
have run out, crews and their guards have to be fed and diesel is needed to keep
lights and desalination facilities operational. Last, stop the supply of drug. Many
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pirates are addicted to the stimulant leaf khat which deteriorates rapidly with time,
meaning that reliable supply lines are needed. So government should figure out the
supply lines of the drug and stop it.

Conclusion
On average large, modern ships with high-value ship, cargo and crew bring in
pirate’s higher initial offer of the ransom price. Naval counter-piracy efforts, the
adoption of best management practice and private security teams have successfully
reduced the incidence of hijackings, but they have not reduced the total income from
piracy: pirates have exploited the hijacked ships more intensively over time as
success rates dropped and they have had to hunt ever further from the Somali coast.

The ransoms are not perfectly predictable, reflecting unobservable characteristics of
the parties in the negotiation such as their respective discount factors, their payoffs
for failed negotiations (mother-ship / insurance pay-out) and their ability to sustain a
negotiation over time. Expert negotiators exploit this information asymmetry. By
sending consistent (cheap talk) signals about his type being a “poor shipowner”
rather than a “rich shipowner”, the shipowner hopes to negotiate a better outcome.
Indeed negotiators are highly paid and well regarded. In addition, the pirates might
call in an expert in order to get advice about useful bargaining skills, which makes the
negotiation process more complex and unfavorable for the shipowner.
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